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Maritime security is one of the latest buzzwords of international relations. Major actors have started to
include maritime security in their mandate or reframed their work in such terms. Maritime security is a
term that draws attention to new challenges and rallies support for tackling these. Yet, no international
consensus over the deﬁnition of maritime security has emerged. Buzzwords allow for the international
coordination of actions, in the absence of consensus. These, however, also face the constant risk that
disagreements and political conﬂict are camouﬂaged. Since there are little prospects of deﬁning
maritime security once and for all, frameworks by which one can identify commonalities and
disagreements are needed. This article proposes three of such frameworks. Maritime security can ﬁrst
be understood in a matrix of its relation to other concepts, such as marine safety, seapower, blue
economy and resilience. Second, the securitization framework allows to study how maritime threats are
made and which divergent political claims these entail in order to uncover political interests and
divergent ideologies. Third, security practice theory enables the study of what actors actually do when
they claim to enhance maritime security. Together these frameworks allow for the mapping of maritime
security.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction: Maritime security—In search for a meaning?
Maritime Security is one of the latest buzzwords of international
relations. Major actors in maritime policy, ocean governance and
international security have in the past decade started to include
maritime security in their mandate or reframed their work in such
terms. In 2014 the United Kingdom, the European Union as well as the
African Union (AU) have launched ambitious maritime security str-
ategies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) included
maritime security as one of its objectives in its 2011 Alliance Maritime
Strategy. The U.S. pioneered this development when launching a
national Maritime Security Policy in 2004. Also, the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) of the International Maritime Organization included
maritime security in their list of tasks. As reﬂected in the U.S. policy,
the concept of ‘maritime security’ gained initial salience after the
terrorist attacks of September 11th and the associated fears over the
spread of maritime terrorism. If maritime terrorism has largely
remained a virtual threat [28], the breakthrough for maritime security
came with the rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia between 2008
and 2011. The dangers of piracy for international trade brought the
maritime dimension of security to the global consciousness and lifted
it high on policy agendas. Moreover, the inter-state tensions in regions,
such as the Arctic, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea and the
signiﬁcant investments in blue water navies of emerging powers, such
as India and China, have increased attention for the oceans as a
security space [7,20,26,35,40].
Maritime Security, like other international buzzwords, is a term
that draws attention to new challenges and rallies support for
tackling these. Discussions of maritime security frequently do so
by pointing to ‘threats’ that prevail in the maritime domain
[22,23,33,43,44]. They refer to threats such as maritime inter-state
disputes, maritime terrorism, piracy, trafﬁcking of narcotics, people
and illicit goods, arms proliferation, illegal ﬁshing, environmental
crimes, or maritime accidents and disasters. The argument is then
that maritime security should be deﬁned as the absence of these
threats. This ‘laundry list’ approach to deﬁning maritime security
has rightfully been criticized as insufﬁcient since it does neither
prioritize issues, nor provides clues of how these issues are inter-
linked, nor outlines of how these threats can be addressed. It
moreover creates enduring puzzles over which threats should be
included. Are climate change and disasters at sea maritime security
issues? Should inter-state disputes be treated in terms of national
security rather than maritime security? Others advocate for an
understanding of maritime security as “good” or “stable order at
sea” [39,44,23]. In contrast to the ‘negative’ deﬁnition of maritime
security as absence of a range of threats, this understa-
nding provides a ‘positive’ conceptualization that projects a certain
ideal-typical end state that has to be reached. In this approach there
is however hardly any discussion of what “good” or “stable” order is
supposed to mean, or whose order it is intended to be. Instead the
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discussion turns immediately to questions of how law enforcement
at sea can be improved. A related discussion aims at deﬁning
maritime security in positive terms by linking it to ‘economic’ or
‘blue growth’. In this economic attempt to deﬁne maritime security,
similar questions arise: whose economy is it concerned about, and
who will be the primary beneﬁciaries of such growth? Discussions
of responses to maritime security outline a rather broad and
incongruent mix of diverse policy proposals which tend to include
calls for more coordination, information sharing, regulation, law
enforcement and capacity building. Again it remains openwhat and
who should be coordinated or regulated and who should build
what kind of capacity. In short, and as several observers have allu-
ded to: no international consensus over the deﬁnition of maritime
security has emerged [22,23].
Is this lack of consensus problematic? Understanding maritime
security as a buzzword provides answers. As Cornwall [15] suggests,
buzzwords “gain their purchase and power through their vague and
euphemistic qualities, their capacity to embrace a multitude of
possible meanings, and their normative resonance.” These are exactly
the qualities that maritime security brings. Buzzwords are what Gallie
[17] has called “essentially contested concepts”. Such concepts repre-
sent a general agreement in the abstract, but they generate endless
(and irresolvable) disagreements about what they might mean in
practice. In Löwy’s [24]) understanding these concepts have a bene-
ﬁcial function since they allow actors to coordinate their action and
proceed in joint activities while simultaneously disagreeing over local
meanings. In policy formulation buzzwords allow for “a measure of
ambiguity to secure the endorsement of diverse potential actors and
audiences” ([15]: 474). They provide “concepts that can ﬂoat free of
concrete referents, to be ﬁlled with meaning by their users. In the
struggles for interpretive power that characterize the negotiation of
the language of policy, buzzwords shelter multiple agendas, providing
room for manoeuvre and space for contestation” ([15]: 474). Buzz-
words, however, also contain the risk, to mask political interests, and
underlying ideologies and leave much of what is actually done in their
name unquestioned ([15]: 472).
Core contemporary international political terms, such as peace-
building or human security (e.g. [9,18]), have such qua-
lities. Grasping maritime security as a buzzword, allows us to under-
stand the salience as well as disagreements around the concept.
Buzzwords, as the literature shows, enable the international coordina-
tion of actions, under the absence of consensus (e.g. [9,11]). Buzz-
words, however, also face the constant risk that disagreements and
political conﬂict are camouﬂaged. Such disagreements might break up
in crisis situations and lead to stalemates and in-action when it is most
needed. They might moreover lead to contradicting activities and
weak coordination, when actors think they are talking about the same
things, when de facto they are not. If maritime security is a buzzword,
then there are little prospects to form an international consensus on
the concept. To phrase it more directly, the intellectual quest of iden-
tifying the deﬁnition that is logically superior by rationalist criteria and
everyonewill hence have to agree on is a rather unproductive exercise.
Divergent political interests and normative understandings will always
lead to different understandings of the concept.
Yet, how can we than cope with this situation? To ﬁnd an
answer, we need to identify frameworks by which one can grasp the
commonalities and disagreements that the concept of maritime
security entails. The objective of this article is to propose three of
such frameworks. These can be developed from recent security
studies. Security studies has been struggling with similar questions
for decades (e.g. [8,37]). The lessons from these discussions suggest
meaningful ways of how to push the intellectual and policy debate
on maritime security forward. The frameworks that are particularly
useful are (1) ‘semiotics’ which intends to map different meanings
by exploring the relations between maritime security and other
concepts, (2) the ‘securitization’ framework which provides the
means to understand how different threats are included in mar-
itime security, and (3) security practice theory which aims at und-
erstanding what actions are undertaken in the name of maritime
security.
The reminder of this article is structured as follows. The next
section draws on the core insights from semiotics that concepts
gain their meaning in relation to other concepts. Maritime security
can hence be understood in the way it organizes older established
and more recent concepts. These include the concept of marine
safety, seapower, blue economy and resilience. Studying these
relations lead to the outline of a maritime security matrix that can
be used to map divergent understandings of maritime security and
explore how different actors situate threats. Section 3 introduces
the securitization framework. The core tenet of this approach is to
study how threats are made and what divergent political claims
they entail. This is an approach especially useful to uncover
political interests and divergent ideologies. The fourth section
discusses the framework of security practice theory. Here the
question is focused on what actors actually do when they claim to
enhance maritime security. The ﬁfth section concludes in arguing
for studies that draw on these framework. Such studies have
signiﬁcant value and facilitate international coordination by map-
ping different understandings of maritime security and bringing
political conﬂicts to the fore.
2. Conceptual relations: A maritime security matrix
In semiotic thinking the meaning of a term can be grasped by
exploring the relations of the term to others. Concepts acquire their
meaning relationally, through their similarities and differences from
other words. The term ‘ﬁsh’, for instance, achieves sense though its
contrast with ‘meat’ or ‘seafood’, its association with ‘gills’ or ‘ﬁns’
and its relation to ‘water’. Maritime security can be analyzed in
similar ways by recognizing the relations to other terms. Maritime
security organizes a web of relations, replaces or subsumes older,
established concepts, as well as relates to more recently developed
ones. At least four of these require consideration: seapower, marine
safety, blue economy, and human resilience. Each of these concepts
points us to the different dimensions of maritime security. The
concepts of seapower and marine safety are century old under-
standings of danger at sea, the latter two have arisen at roughly the
same time as maritime security.
A discourse on security at sea preceding the current debate on
‘maritime security’ is that of naval warfare, the importance of mar-
itime power projection, and the concept of seapower. Firmly based in
a traditionalist understanding of national security as the protection of
the survival of states, the concept of ‘seapower’ aims at laying out the
role of naval forces and at elaborating strategies for their use [39]. In
peacetime the role of warships is mainly seen in protecting the core
sea lines of communication in order to facilitate trade and economic
prosperity by means of deterrence as well as surveillance and
interdiction [36]. The concept of seapower is related to maritime
security in several ways. It ﬁrst concerns the fact that naval forces are
one of the major actors in maritime security. Moreover, discussions of
seapower address in how far state forces should act outside their
territorial waters, engage in other regions than their own and have a
presence in international waters.
The concept of ‘marine safety’ addresses the safety of ships and
maritime installations with the primary purpose of protecting
maritime professionals and the marine environment. Marine
safety in the ﬁrst place implies the regulation of the construction
of vessels and maritime installations, the regular control of their
safety procedures as well as the education of maritime profes-
sionals in complying with regulations. Marine safety is closely
linked to the work of the International Maritime Organization and
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its Maritime Safety Committee1 which acts as the core interna-
tional body for developing rules and regulations. If the core
concerns of marine safety, following the Titanic accident in 1912
were in search and rescue and the protection of the life of seafarers
and passengers, this has gradually shifted to environmental con-
cerns and the prevention of collisions, accidents and the environ-
mental disasters these may cause. Notably oil spills recorded from
the 1970s have raised the proﬁle of the environmental dimension
of marine safety, while events such as the 1991 Gulf War oil spill
revealed the link between traditional security and environmental
concerns. Safety concerns are core to maritime security given that
it may involve environmental and cultural interests. Marine safety
has also been increasingly linked to maritime security given that
the maritime industry, shipping companies and their employees
are simultaneously potential targets (e.g. of pirates, terrorists, or
criminals) as well as potential perpetrators (by engaging in
maritime crimes such as trafﬁcking of persons, illicit goods or
weapons or in collaborating with violent actors).
Maritime security is however also linked to economic development.
Throughout history the oceans were always of vital economic impor-
tance. The majority of trade is conducted via the sea and ﬁsheries is a
signiﬁcant industry. Both global shipping and ﬁsheries have developed
into multi-billion industries. The commercial value of the oceans has
moreover been increasingly re-evaluated due to the economic potential
of offshore resources, centrally fossil energy but also seabed mining, as
well as the economic promises of coastal tourism. The concepts of ‘blue
economy’ and ‘blue growth’ – proposed at the 2012 Rioþ20 world
summit2 and widely endorsed, for instance, in the European Union’s
Blue Growth Strategy – aim at linking and integrating the different
dimensions of the economic development of the oceans and construct-
ing sustainable management strategies for these. The concept of blue
economy is linked to maritime security since sustainable management
strategies not only require the enforcement andmonitoring of laws and
regulations, but a secure maritime environment provides the precondi-
tion for managing marine resources.
Two of the core dimensions in the concept of blue economy, food
security and the resilience of coastal populations are directly linked to
the fourth concept that needs to be considered for understanding the
semiotic relations of maritime security, that is, human security. Human
security is a major proposal for an alternative to understanding security
in terms of national security coined in the 1990s. Proposed originally by
the United Nations Development Program, the concept intends to
center security considerations on the needs of people rather than states
(e.g. [18,27,30]). Core dimensions of human security concern food,
shelter, sustainable livelihoods and safe employment. Considering that
ﬁsheries are a vital source of food and employment, notably in the least
developed countries, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing
is a major problem impacting human security3. Human security has
however several maritime dimensions, which stretches from the
security of seafarers to the vulnerability of coastal populations to mari-
time threats more broadly. Notably the resilience of coastal populations
has been identiﬁed as a key factor in the emergence of maritime
threats and is hence vital in their prevention4.
Maritime Security relates these four concepts to each other, or
potentially even intends to replace them. The semiotic perspective
implies that for understanding what meaning actors subscribe to
maritime security we can study the relations they suggest to those
other concepts. Graphically this can be projected as a matrix. Fig. 1,
provides a maritime security matrix that intends to project the
relations between those concepts in ideal typical terms. It places
maritime security in the center of these. It also situates the different
issues of maritime security, further discussed below, in those relations.
Working with such a matrix ﬁrst of all allows for the study of the
types of relations established by different actors between maritime
security and other concepts. The matrix provides moreover a basis
for scrutinizing what actors include and exclude in their concept of
maritime security. As further discussed in Section 3, interpretations
of threats can differ remarkably. For some actors, an issue might be
primarily linked to the economic dimensions, while it is for others
an issue of national security or safety. Fig. 1 is an ideal-typical
version which reﬂects how the author would relate the concepts to
one another. It is important to note that drawing on the matrix does
not imply starting out from any idealized understanding and to
argue that maritime security should integrate all of the four other
concepts. The matrix is an analytical tool to grasp the differences
and commonalities of understandings of different actors.
Security actors signiﬁcantly diverge over how they draw these
relations and position threats within these. NATO’s Alliance Mar-
itime Strategy [29], for instance, excludes the lower, left corner from
its understanding of maritime security in arguing that these are
separate so called high end tasks, and then primarily focusses on
issues related to the blue economy and human resilience. The
African Integrated Maritime Strategy of the AU [5], by contrast
centers on the blue economy and argues that maritime security
challenges are primarily relevant because they hamper economic
growth. Starting out from the upper right corner the AU quite
surprisingly excludes traditional considerations of inter-state dis-
pute or state rivalry from its strategy. Other strategies, such as the
EU’s or UK’s maritime security strategy, have strong relations to all
four concepts and argue for a comprehensive approach that
emphasizes the connectivity of the issues ([41]).
3. Deconstructing threats: The securitization framework
A second framework can be drawn from constructivist security
studies developed since the 1990s. The political debates over the
content and priorities of security and defence policies in the after-
math of the Cold War led soon to the recognition within security
studies that what was required was an analysis of the political
process by which threats are constructed and issues are lifted on the
security agenda. One of the major frameworks that emerged out of
this discussion is the ‘securitization framework’. Originally proposed
by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan [14] he framework posits that there
is a genuine logic to threat construction, hence such processes can by
analyzed through a generic framework.
MARINE ENVIRONMENT ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT
NATIONALSECURITY HUMAN SECURITY
MARINESAFETY BLUE ECONOMY
MARITIME
SECURITY
SEAPOWER RESILIENCE
IUU Fishing
Human  
Trafficking
Piracy
PollutionAccidents Smuggling
Terrorist
Acts 
Inter-state
Disputes 
Arms 
Proliferation 
Climate 
Change  
Fig. 1. Maritime security matrix.
1 The mandate of the MSC deﬁnes the issues it deals with as comprising of
“aids to navigation, construction and equipment of vessels, manning from a safety
standpoint, rules for the prevention of collisions, handling of dangerous cargoes,
maritime safety procedures and requirements, hydrographic information, log-
books and navigational records, marine casualty investigation, salvage and rescue”.
2 The concept of blue economy was initially proposed by Pauli's [31] report to
the Club of Rome.
3 See for instance the analysis of ﬁsheries in Sierra Leone by Thorpe et al. [38].
4 See the discussion in Abbott and Renwick [1] and Klein [21] for the case of
piracy.
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Securitization suggests that threats are constructed by (a series) of
claims that draw on a certain generic grammar. In this grammar an
issue, such as piracy, is presented to be an existential threat to a
certain referent object, for instance the nation state or international
trade. Such claims are only successful if they are presented by actors
that have the authority to speak about security and if a relevant
target audience accepts such threats. Threat construction usually
comes along with a proposal for measures that should be taken to
protect the reference object from the threat. For Buzan and Waever
[14] it is a speciﬁc characteristic of security, that counter-measures
are extraordinary and often extreme. They might involve military
instruments up to the scale of military conﬂict or a signiﬁcant cut-
back of civil liberties.
Drawing on the securitization framework to understand mar-
itime security leads to two potential tracks of investigation. First,
the question can be addressed by which securitization claims ‘the
maritime’ has become an issue that is securitized. This implies to
ask how the contemporary understanding of the oceans and the
sea as a space of insecurity and threats has come about and how it
has changed over time. Writing a genealogy will be the likely
outcome considering that the discourse of the oceans as a zone of
danger and uncertainty can be traced at least back to the Antique
[25]. Such an analysis provides a grand picture of how and why
‘the maritime’ is a source of insecurity or a reference object that
requires to be protected.
The second track is a ﬁne-grained analysis of how different
issues have been securitized to form the maritime security agenda.
A careful reconstruction of the issues on the laundry list of maritime
security is the outcome and attention given to the question of who
securitizes issues towards which audience and with what kind of
reference objects in mind. For deciphering different (and compet-
ing) political interests it is particularly revealing to ask which
reference objects are entailed in maritime securitizations. What
are the reference objects that actually have to be protected from the
maritime security threats?
The majority of international actors deﬁnes maritime security
by identifying a number of threats that the concept includes. If the
precise phrasing differs across agencies, the 2008 UN Secretary
General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea provides an
outline of the threats commonly included ([42], 18–33). The report
differentiates between seven. (1) Piracy and armed robbery,
(2) terrorist acts, (3) the illicit trafﬁcking in arms and weapons
of mass destruction, (4) the illicit trafﬁcking in narcotics, (5) smug-
gling and trafﬁcking of persons by sea, (6) illegal, unreported and
unregulated ﬁshing and (7) intentional and unlawful damage to
the marine environment.
Recent strategy documents by the EU and the UK offer similar
outlines. The UK’s 2014 maritime security strategy refers to “maritime
security risks” rather than threats, and clusters some of the issues
together. It describes one of these risks for instance as the “disruption
to vital maritime trade routes as a result of war, criminality, piracy or
changes in international norms” ([41]: 17). It also adds to this list by
including “cyber attacks against shipping or maritime infrastructure”
([41]: 17). The EU likewise includes cyber security but extends the list
of seven threats by also including “territorial maritime disputes, acts of
aggression and armed conﬂict between States” ([16]:3) as well as
“potential impacts of natural disasters, extreme events and climate
change on the maritime transport system and in particular on the
maritime infrastructure” and “conditions at sea and in the coastal zone
that weaken the potential for growth and jobs in the marine and
maritime sectors” ([16]: 4).
The objective of a ﬁne-grained securitization analysis will be to
reconstruct how these threats and risks have been lifted on the
agenda of the respective actors. This will provide an understanding
what the respective actors deem worth protecting (and what not)
and by which measures. Taking this perspective will show when
and how actors understanding of threats converge and when they
signiﬁcantly differ.
The securitization framework moreover points us to an important
dynamic: As the literature has shown, securitization implies that
issues are treated as urgent and top-priority matters and that usually
more resources are devoted to them [14]. The securitization of
maritime problems is then one the one side a welcome development
since it raises the proﬁle of maritime issues and increases the
resources available to address these. Securitization, on the other side,
has a distinct logic which usually entails that extreme measures are
taken and short term reactions are preferred. Phrased otherwise
securitization does not necessary lead to optimal and sustainable
solutions. Hence, the outcome might be wrong investments or to
give preference to hugely expensive short term solutions (such as
employing military forces). This dynamic has been for instance
shown for the case of migration5. Understanding migration as threat
has undermined economic or humanitarian understandings, led to
often extreme measures of border control and silenced the humani-
tarian tragedies that cases of illegal migration might imply.
4. Security practice and communities of practice
The third framework moves away from considerations of lang-
uage and asks what actors actually do in the name of maritime
security. What kind of activities are conducted when actors say
that they are doing maritime security?
Such a perspective takes up clues from securitization analysis
in that it is interested in the implementation of the measures that
securitization processes imply. It is embedded in an understanding
of security politics in which practice, understood as organized
patterns of doing and sayings, is the central unit of analysis
[32,12]. From such a perspective also the question of which tools
and technologies, such as navy ships or sattelites, are used in
maritime security practice is of core interest.
There is a spectrum of practices which are conventionally part of
maritime security, yet agencies engage in different of these6. These
practices ﬁrst include those that are geared at Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA). This includes surveillance through radar, sattelites
or tracking data and the sharing and fusing of such information
through databases and service centers. Second, activities at sea, such
as patrolling, interdictions, searches and inspections, but also exer-
cises. Third, law enforcement activities, such as arrests, the transfer of
suspects, as well as prosecution, trials and prisons. Fourth, coordina-
tion activities on different levels. This might involve meetings and
conferences and the harmonization of legal standards, procedures,
mandates or the development of strategies and implementation
plans. Other potential practices might, ﬁfth, be seen in activities
such as naval diplomacy, capacity building, but also naval warfare. In
this latter type whether the practices belong to maritime security or
not, will be contested.
Studies of maritime security practices revolve around two differ-
ent perspectives which promise different insights. Studies of routine
practices, that is what actors do on an everyday basis such as those
outlined above, will reveal how the meaning of maritime security
becomes settled and institutionalized in a distinct set of practices.
Another perspective implies to investigate when it is contentious,
whether a set of activities should be carried out under the name of
maritime security. Practices such as naval warfare, naval diplomacy
and maritime capacity building, potentially belong to other ﬁelds of
meaning (war, diplomacy, development). Studying the controversies
5 For the debate on the consequences of the securitization of migration see
among others Aradau [6], Huysmans [19], and Roe [34].
6 See Bueger and Stockbruegger [13] for an exemplary reconstruction of such
practices drawing on the case of counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
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around such practices promises insights on how actors delimit the
meaning of maritime security.
The provision of maritime security is a major inter-agency chal-
lenge even on a national level. The broader the understanding of
maritime security the wider the range of actors involved. While the
precise form of national coordination, joint policies and operations,
and information sharing depends on the design of governmental
activity different functional agencies require to be coordinated. This
includes civil-military coordination, since “there is no deﬁnable
separation between civil activities and naval operations” ([23]: 6). It
includes several regulatory agencies, such as ministries of transport,
ﬁsheries, agriculture and trade, and legal agencies, from coast guards,
to port authorities, border guards, the police or intelligence services. It
also concerns the coordination between the state and shipping and
ﬁshing companies, resource industries, as well private maritime
security providers. Actors from the maritime industry are a potential
target as well as potential perpetrators. Private security provision is a
growing industry. Security companies not only protect port facilities or
maritime installations but also provide armed guards on board vessels,
or might even be contracted to manage entire Exclusive Economic
Zones, such as in the case of Benin.
Maritime security is widely understood as a transnational task.
The 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report stresses the importance of
international cooperation and coordinated responses, and stresses
that maritime security is a shared responsibility and requires a new
vision of collective security. Other maritime strategies including
those of the US, NATO, the EU or the UK equally emphasise the
importance of multilateralism and joint coordinated responses. This
is consequential given that maritime security threats are transna-
tional and perpetrators operate across boundaries, maritime inse-
curity has transnational consequences, but also due to the liquid
nature of maritime territorial boundaries, and the complex transna-
tional character of global shipping and trade in which any single
operation includes various nationals and jurisdictions.
Scrutinizing who does what in the name of maritime security
moreover enables to address what actors actually do together, how
they cooperate with each other and what potential effects this
cooperation can have. A viable route to addressing this dimension
is to rely on the concept of maritime security communities.
The concept of maritime security communities [10] describes an
ideal form of cooperation between all actors relevant to the maritime
sector. In this ideal form all maritime stakeholders securitize together,
that is, they identify which threats are existential for which referent
objects, and what should be done about it. Actors engage on a day to
day basis, share information and coordinate their activities. They
develop a common repertoire of understandings and tools to foster
maritime security. The concept of maritime security communities
draws on and speciﬁes the concept of security communities for the
challenges of maritime security. Following the original proposal by
integration theorists Karl Deutsch, security communities have been
understood as a form of political cooperation largely characterized by
the absence of war, the peaceful settlement of conﬂict among a
communities members and a growing sense of mutual trust and the
development of a collective identity. For Deutsch and later genera-
tions of analysts, NATO and the European Union were the proto-types
of security communities [2,4].
The notion of maritime security communities integrates current
thinking about security communities and develops this concept
further in arguing that an appropriate understanding of security
has to go beyond the traditional understanding of the absence of war.
Security communities are a distinct form of security governance that
differs from others such as alliances [3,13]. Security communities are
about shared securitizations, how distinct threats are identiﬁed and
how a community deals with them collectively. Moreover, this
reformulation clariﬁes that what makes security communities thrive
are not formal treaties, communiques or declarations, but everyday
transnational practices. This might involve high-level politicians and
diplomats, but primarily concerns the broader range of lower and
mid-level security practitioners and experts and how they engage
with each other. The concept of maritime security community is an
ideal type. It is useful to evaluate how actors collaborate in maritime
security. Yet, no really existing community will ever fully correspond
to the expectations of the concept of security community.
5. Conclusion: Mapping maritime security
Maritime security is a buzzword. It has no deﬁnite meaning. It
achieves its meaning by actors relating the concept to others, by
attempts to ﬁll it with different issues and by acting in the name of it.
If actors agree on the value of maritime security in general terms, its
practical meaning will always vary across actors, time and space.
Striving for a universally acceptable deﬁnition of maritime security is
hence an unproductive quest. This article has set out to devise ways
of how to cope with the multi-vocality of the concept. Three
strategies have been outlined to make sense of the meaning of
maritime security and to unravel political interests and worldviews.
These strategies provide productive access point into the study of
maritime security and scrutinizing the divergent perspectives of
actors in distinct spaces.
Asking the question ‘What is Maritime Security?’, hence, leads to
a prospective research agenda of mapping the meaning of the
concept. Such studies have direct policy implications on national
and international level. They reveal when and how actors agree and
disagree and foster mutual understanding. They enable to cope with
coordination problems, and allow for a different type of interpreta-
tion of maritime disputes that do not start with assumed interests
of actors but with an analysis of the meaning actors subscribe to the
maritime as a security space. Finally, such studies will also assist in
establishing the contours of the emerging sub-discipline of Mar-
itime Security Studies and elaborate on its transdisciplinary links to
economics, development studies, environmental studies or global
governance studies.
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